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in perception research. First, scientists have long theorized that 
oscillations could divide the continuous sequence of inputs feed-
ing into our perceptual systems into a series of discrete cycles or 
“snapshots” (Pitts and McCulloch, 1947; Stroud, 1956; Harter, 1967; 
Allport, 1968; Sanford, 1971), but this idea is far from mainstream 
nowadays; we refer to this debate as “discrete vs. continuous percep-
tion” (VanRullen and Koch, 2003). Second, there is another long-
standing debate known as “parallel vs. sequential attention”: does 
attention concentrate its resources simultaneously or sequentially 
when there are multiple targets to focus on? Though this discussion 
is generally disconnected from the topic of brain oscillations, we 
will argue that it is in fact germane to the previous question. The 
sequential attention idea – which has traditionally been the domi-
nant one – originated with the assumption that high-level vision 
cannot process more than one object at a time, and must there-
fore shift periodically between the stimuli (Eriksen and Spencer, 
1969; Treisman, 1969; Kahneman, 1973), just like our gaze must 
shift around because our fovea cannot fixate on multiple objects 
simultaneously. Interestingly, sequential attention theories require 
a (possibly irregular) cyclic process for disengaging attention at 
the current target location and engaging it anew. It is easy to see 
– although little noticed in the literature – that discrete percep-
tion is merely an extension of this idea, obtained by assuming that 
the “periodic engine” keeps running, even when there is only one 
stimulus to process. This connection between the two theories will 
be a recurring thread in the present narrative.
Of course, the primary source of evidence about these topics 
is (and should remain) based on neurophysiological recordings, 
which provide direct measurements of the neuronal oscillations. 
For example, we have recently reviewed our past EEG work on the 
perceptual correlates of ongoing oscillations, with a focus on linking 
these oscillations to the notion of discrete perception (VanRullen 
et al., 2011). Another example is a recent study in macaque monkeys 
revealing that oscillatory neuronal activity in the frontal eye field 
IntroductIon
Neurons convey information by means of electrical signals. Due to 
intrinsic properties of neuronal networks (e.g., conduction delays, 
balance between excitation and inhibition, membrane time con-
stants), these electrical pulses give rise to large-scale periodic fluctua-
tions of the background electric potential, which constitute the brain 
“rhythms” and oscillations (Buzsaki, 2006). Some oscillations – like 
the “alpha” rhythm at 8–13 Hz can be seen with the naked eye on an 
electro-encephalographic trace (Berger, 1929), while others require 
sophisticated analysis methods or recordings with a higher signal-
to-noise ratio (using intra-cerebral probes in animals and, more 
rarely, in humans). There are many theories implicating brain oscil-
lations in the performance of particular cognitive functions such 
as perception (Eckhorn et al., 1988; Gray et al., 1989; Engel et al., 
1991; Singer and Gray, 1995; von der Malsburg, 1995), attention 
(Niebur et al., 1993; Fell et al., 2003; Womelsdorf and Fries, 2007), 
consciousness (Koch and Braun, 1996; Gold, 1999; Engel and Singer, 
2001), and memory (Lisman and Idiart, 1995; Klimesch, 1999; 
Kahana et al., 2001). There are also flurries of experimental stud-
ies supporting (and sometimes, invalidating) these theories based 
on electrophysiological measurements of brain activity (Revonsuo 
et al., 1997; Tallon-Baudry et al., 1997, 1998; Fries et al., 2001; Jensen 
et al., 2002; Gail et al., 2004; Ray and Maunsell, 2010). It is somewhat 
less ordinary, on the other hand, to investigate the consequences of 
brain oscillations using psychophysical techniques. Yet one major 
prediction of the above-mentioned theories is directly amenable to 
psychophysical experimentation: indeed, an oscillatory implementa-
tion at the neuronal level should imply that the relevant cognitive 
function fluctuates periodically, and such fluctuations should be 
measurable with standard (or slightly more sophisticated) experi-
mental psychology techniques.
The purpose of this article is to review some of the psychophysi-
cal techniques that have been applied recently to the study of brain 
oscillations. In so doing, we will touch upon two classical debates 
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reflects the successive cycles of a clearly sequential attentional explo-
ration process during visual search (Buschman and Miller, 2009). 
In this review we focus on purely psychophysical methods, not 
because they are better than direct neurophysiological measure-
ments, but because they also inform us about psychological and 
perceptual consequences of the postulated periodicities. However, 
due to the inherent temporal limitations of most psychophysical 
methods, it should be kept in mind that in practice this approach is 
probably restricted to the lower end of the frequency spectrum, i.e., 
oscillations in the delta (0–4 Hz), theta (4–8 Hz), alpha (8–14 Hz), 
and possibly beta (14–30 Hz) bands. Higher-frequency oscillations 
(e.g., gamma: 30–80 Hz) may still play a role in sensory process-
ing, but they are generally less amenable to direct psychophysical 
observation.
There exist many psychophysical paradigms designed to test 
the temporal limits of sensory systems but that do not directly 
implicate periodic perception or attention, because their results 
can also be explained by temporal “smoothing” or integration, in 
the context of a strictly continuous model of perception (Di Lollo 
and Wilson, 1978). These paradigms are nonetheless useful to the 
discrete argument because they constrain the range of plausible 
periodicities: for example, temporal numerosity judgments or sim-
ultaneity judgments indicate that the temporal limit for individuat-
ing visual events is only around 10 events per second (White et al., 
1953; Lichtenstein, 1961; White, 1963; Holcombe, 2009), suggesting 
a potential oscillatory correlate in the alpha band (Harter, 1967). 
We will not develop these results further here, focusing instead 
on paradigms that unequivocally indicate periodic sampling of 
perception or attention. Similarly, although some psychophysical 
studies have demonstrated that perception and attention can be 
entrained to a low-frequency rhythmic structure in the stimulus 
sequence (Large and Jones, 1999; Mathewson et al., 2010), we will 
only concentrate here on studies implicating intrinsic perceptual 
and attentional rhythms (i.e., rhythms that are not present in the 
stimulus). We will see that progress can be made on the two debates 
of discrete vs. continuous perception and sequential vs. parallel 
attention by addressing them together rather than separately.
rhythmIc samplIng of a sIngle stImulus: dIscrete vs. 
contInuous perceptIon
Suppose that a new stimulus suddenly appears in your visual field, 
say a red light at the traffic intersection. For such a transient onset, a 
sequence of visual processing mechanisms from your retina to your 
high-level visual cortex will automatically come into play, allowing 
you after a more or less fixed latency to “perceive” this stimulus, i.e., 
experience it as part of the world in front of you. Hopefully you 
should then stop at the intersection. What happens next? For as 
long as the stimulus remains in the visual field, you will continue 
to experience it. But how do you know it is still there? You might 
argue that if it were gone, the same process as previously would 
now signal the transient offset (together with the onset of the green 
light), and you would then recognize that the red light is gone. But 
in-between those two moments, you did experience the red light as 
present – did you only fill in the mental contents of this intervening 
period after the green light appeared? This sounds unlikely, at least 
if your traffic lights last as long as they do around here. Maybe the 
different stages of your visual system were constantly processing 
their (unchanged) inputs and feeding their (unchanged) outputs 
to the next stage, just in case the stimulus might happen to change 
right then – a costly but plausible strategy. An intermediate alter-
native would consist in sampling the external world periodically 
to verify, and potentially update, its contents; the period could be 
chosen to minimize metabolic effort, while maximizing the chances 
of detecting any changes within an ecologically useful delay (e.g., to 
avoid honking from impatient drivers behind you when you take 
too long to notice the green light). These last two strategies are 
respectively known as continuous and discrete perception.
The specific logic of the above example may have urged you 
to favor discrete perception, but the scientific community tradi-
tionally sides with the continuous idea. It has not always been so, 
however. In particular, the first observations of EEG oscillations 
in the early twentieth century (Berger, 1929), together with the 
simultaneous popularization of the cinema, prompted many post-
war scientists to propose that the role of brain oscillations could be 
to chunk sensory information into unitary events or “snapshots,” 
similar to what happens in the movies (Pitts and McCulloch, 1947; 
Stroud, 1956; Harter, 1967). Much experimental research ensued, 
which we have already reviewed elsewhere (VanRullen and Koch, 
2003). The question was never fully decided, however, and the 
community’s interest eventually faded. The experimental efforts 
that we describe in this section all result from an attempt to fol-
low up on this past work and revive the scientific appeal of the 
discrete perception theory.
perIodIcItIes In reactIon tIme dIstrIbutIons
Some authors have reasoned that if the visual system samples the 
external world discretely, the time it would take an observer to react 
after the light turns green would depend on the precise moment at 
which this event occurred, relative to the ongoing samples: if the 
stimulus is not detected within one given sample then the response 
will be delayed at least until the next sampling period. This rela-
tion may be visible in histograms of reaction time (RT). Indeed, 
multiple peaks separated by a more or less constant period are 
often apparent in RT histograms: these multimodal distributions 
have been reported with a period of approximately 100 ms for 
verbal choice responses (Venables, 1960), 10–40 ms for auditory 
and visual discrimination responses (Dehaene, 1993), 10–15 ms 
for saccadic responses (Latour, 1967), 30 ms for smooth pursuit 
eye movement initiation responses (Poppel and Logothetis, 1986). 
It must be emphasized, however, that an oscillation can only be 
found in a histogram of post-stimulus RTs if each stimulus either 
evokes a novel oscillation, or resets an existing one. Otherwise 
(and assuming that the experiment is properly designed, i.e., with 
unpredictable stimulus onsets), the moment of periodic sampling 
will always occur at a random time with respect to the stimulus 
onset; thus, the peaks of response probability corresponding to 
the recurring sampling moments will average out, when the his-
togram is computed over many trials. In other words, even though 
these periodicities in RT distributions are intriguing, they do not 
unambiguously demonstrate that perception samples the world 
periodically – for example, it could just be that each stimulus onset 
triggers an oscillation in the motor system that will subsequently 
constrain the response generation process. In the following sections, 
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chophysically the rate ω of the periodic process, and its modulation 
amplitude a (Figure 1).
In practice, unfortunately, this method is not as easy to apply as 
it sounds. One important caveat was already mentioned by Latour: 
the inter-stimulus delay must be chosen to be long enough to avoid 
direct interactions between the two stimuli (e.g., masking, apparent 
motion, etc.). This is because the mathematical derivation of Eq. 2 
assumes independence between the detection probabilities for the 
two stimuli. To ensure that this condition is satisfied, the stimuli 
should be separated by a few 100 ms (corresponding to the integra-
tion period for masking or apparent motion); on the other hand, 
this implies that several oscillatory cycles will occur between the 
two stimuli, and many external factors (e.g., phase slip, reset) can 
thus interfere and decrease the measured oscillation. This in turn 
suggests that the method may be more appropriate for revealing 
low-frequency oscillations than high-frequency ones (e.g., gamma). 
Another important limitation is that the magnitude of the meas-
ured oscillation in the double-detection function (2) is squared, 
compared to the magnitude of the original perceptual oscillation. 
Although this is not a problem if the perceptual oscillation is strong 
(i.e., the square of a number close to 1 is also close to 1), it can 
we present other psychophysical methods that can reveal perceptual 
periodicities within ongoing brain activity, i.e., without assuming a 
post-stimulus phase reset.
double-detectIon functIons
As illustrated in the previous section, there is an inherent difficulty 
in studying the perceptual consequences of ongoing oscillations: 
even if the pre-stimulus oscillatory phase modulates the sensory 
processing of the stimulus, this pre-stimulus phase will be different 
on successive repetitions of the experimental trial, and the average 
performance over many trials will show no signs of the modula-
tion. Obviously, this problem can be overcome if the phase on each 
trial can be precisely estimated, for example using EEG recordings 
(VanRullen et al., 2011). With purely psychophysical methods, how-
ever, the problem is a real challenge.
An elegant way to get around this challenge has been proposed 
by Latour (1967). With this method, he showed preliminary evi-
dence that visual detection thresholds could fluctuate along with 
ongoing oscillations in the gamma range (30–80 Hz). The idea is 
to present two stimuli on each trial, with a variable delay between 
them, and measure the observer’s performance for detecting (or 
discriminating, recognizing, etc.) both stimuli: even if each stimu-
lus’s absolute relation to an ongoing oscillatory phase cannot be 
estimated, the probability of double-detection should oscillate as 
a function of the inter-stimulus delay (Figure 1). In plain English, 
the logic is that when the inter-stimulus delay is a multiple of the 
oscillatory period, the observer will be very likely to detect both 
stimuli (if they both fall at the optimal phase of the oscillation) 
or to miss both stimuli altogether (if they both fall at the opposite 
phase); on the other hand, if the delay is chosen in-between two 
multiples of the oscillatory period, then the observer will be very 
likely to detect only one of the two stimuli (if the first stimulus 
occurs at the optimal phase, the other will fall at the opposite, 
and vice-versa).
More formally, let us assume that the probability of measuring 
our psychological variable ψ (e.g., target detection, discrimination, 
recognition, etc.) depends periodically (with period 2π/ω) on the 
time of presentation of the stimulation s; to a first approximation 
this can be noted:
ps pa t (| )( sin( )) ψω == =⋅ +⋅ ⋅ 11 1 0      (1)
where p0 is the average expected measurement probability, and a 
is the amplitude of the periodic modulation. Since the time t of 
stimulation (with respect to the ongoing oscillation) may change 
for different repetitions of the measurement, only p0 can be meas-
ured with classical trial averaging methods (i.e., the “sine” term 
will average out to a mean value of zero). However, if two identical 
stimulations are presented, separated by an interval δt, the condi-
tional probability of measuring our psychological variable twice 
can be shown to be (there is no room here, unfortunately, for the 
corresponding mathematical demonstration):
pspa t () ( ((( )) cos( ))) ψω δ == ⋅⋅ ⋅ 2201 2
22 |= +/
 
(2)
The resulting probability only depends on the interval δt (chosen 
by the experimenter), and thus does not require knowledge of the 
exact oscillatory phase on every trial. This means that, using double 
Figure 1 | Double-detection functions can reveal periodicities even 
when the phase varies across trials. (A) Protocol. Let us assume that the 
probability of detecting a stimulus (i.e., the system’s sensitivity) fluctuates 
periodically along with the phase of an ongoing oscillatory process. By 
definition, this process bears no relation with the timing of each trial, and thus 
the phase will differ on each trial. On successive trials, not one but two stimuli 
are presented, with a variable delay between them. (B) Expected results. 
Because the phase of the oscillatory process at the moment of stimulus 
presentation is fully unpredictable, the average probability of detecting each 
stimulus as a function of time (using an absolute reference, such as the trial 
onset) will be constant (left). The probability of detecting the second stimulus 
will also be independent of the time elapsed since the first one (middle). 
However, the probability of detecting both stimuli (albeit smaller) will oscillate 
as a function of the delay between them, and the period of this oscillation will 
be equal to the period of the original ongoing oscillatory process (adapted 
from Latour, 1967).
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In this case, however, because no artificial device is imposing a 
periodic sampling of the stimulus, the logical conclusion is that 
the illusion must be caused by aliasing within the visual system 
itself. Thus, this “continuous version of the wagon wheel illusion” 
(or “c-WWI”) has been interpreted as evidence that the visual sys-
tem samples motion information periodically (Purves et al., 1996; 
Andrews et al., 2005; Simpson et al., 2005; VanRullen et al., 2005b).
There are many arguments in favor of this “discrete” interpre-
tation of the c-WWI. First, the illusion occurs in a very specific 
range of stimulus temporal frequencies, compatible with a discrete 
sampling rate of approximately 13 Hz (Purves et al., 1996; Simpson 
et al., 2005; VanRullen et al., 2005b). As expected according to the 
discrete sampling idea, this critical frequency remains unchanged 
when manipulating the spatial frequency of the stimulus (Simpson 
et al., 2005; VanRullen et al., 2005b) or the type of motion employed, 
i.e., rotation vs. translation motion, or first-order vs. second-order 
motion (VanRullen et al., 2005b). EEG correlates of the perceived 
illusion confirm these psychophysical findings and point to an oscil-
lation in the same frequency range around 13 Hz (VanRullen et al., 
2006; Piantoni et al., 2010). Altogether, these data suggest that (at 
least part of) the motion perception system proceeds by sampling 
its inputs periodically, at a rate of 13 samples per second.
There are, of course, alternative accounts of the phenomenon. 
First, it is noteworthy that the illusion is not instantaneous, and does 
not last indefinitely, but it is instead a bistable phenomenon, which 
comes and goes with stochastic dynamics; such a process implies the 
existence of a competition between neural mechanisms support-
ing the veridical and the erroneous motion directions (Blake and 
Logothetis, 2002). Within this context, the debate centers around the 
source of the erroneous signals: some authors have argued that they 
arise not from periodic sampling and aliasing, but from spurious 
activation in low-level motion detectors (Kline et al., 2004; Holcombe 
et al., 2005) or from motion adaptation processes that would momen-
tarily prevail over the steady input (Holcombe and Seizova-Cajic, 
2008; Kline and Eagleman, 2008). We find these accounts unsat-
isfactory, because they do not seem compatible with the following 
experimental observations: (i) the illusion is always maximal around 
the same temporal frequency, whereas the temporal frequency tun-
ing of low-level motion detectors differs widely between first and 
second-order motion (Hutchinson and Ledgeway, 2006); (ii) not 
only the magnitude of the illusion, but also its spatial extent and 
its optimal temporal frequency – which we take as a reflection of 
the system’s periodic sampling rate – are all affected by attentional 
manipulations (VanRullen et al., 2005b; VanRullen, 2006; Macdonald 
et al., under review); in contrast, the amount of motion adaptation 
could be assumed to vary with attentional load (Chaudhuri, 1990; 
Rezec et al., 2004), but probably not the frequency tuning of low-level 
motion detectors; (iii) motion adaptation itself can be dissociated 
from the wagon wheel illusion using appropriate stimulus manipula-
tions; for example, varying stimulus contrast or eccentricity can make 
the motion aftereffects (both static and dynamic versions) decrease 
while the c-WWI magnitude increases, and vice-versa (VanRullen, 
2007); (iv) finally, the brain regions responsible for the c-WWI effect, 
repeatedly identified in the right parietal lobe (VanRullen et al., 2006, 
2008; Reddy et al., 2011), point to a higher-level cause than the mere 
adaptation of low-level motion detectors.
become troublesome when the original perceptual oscillation is 
already subtle (e.g., for a 20% modulation of the visual threshold, 
one can only expect a 4% modulation in the double-detection func-
tion). Altogether, these limitations may explain why Latour’s results 
have, so far, not been replicated or extended.
temporal alIasIng: the wagon wheel IllusIon
Engineers know that any signal sampled by a discrete or peri-
odic system is subject to potential “aliasing” artifacts (Figure 2): 
when the sampling resolution is lower than a critical limit (the 
“Nyquist rate”) the signal can be interpreted erroneously. This is 
true, for instance, when a signal is sampled in the temporal domain 
(Figure 2A). When this signal is a periodic visual pattern in motion, 
aliasing produces a phenomenon called the “wagon wheel illusion” 
(Figure 2B): the pattern appears to move in the wrong direction. 
This is often observed in movies or on television, due to the dis-
crete sampling of video cameras (generally around 24 frames per 
second). Interestingly, a similar perceptual effect has also been 
reported under continuous conditions of illumination, e.g., day-
Figure 2 | Temporal aliasing. (A) Concept. Sampling a temporal signal using 
too low a sampling rate leads to systematic errors about the signal, known as 
“aliasing errors. ” Here, the original signal is periodic, but its frequency is too 
high compared with the system’s sampling rate (i.e., it is above the system’s 
“Nyquist” frequency, defined as half of its sampling rate). As a result, the 
successive samples skip ahead by almost one full period of the original 
oscillation: instead of normally going through the angular phases of zero, π/2, 
π, 3π/2, and back to zero, the successive samples describe the opposite 
pattern, i.e., zero, 3π/2, π, π/2, and so on. The aliasing is particularly clear in the 
complex domain (right), where the representations of the original and 
estimated signals describe circles in opposite directions. (B) The wagon wheel 
illusion. When the original signal is a periodically moving stimulus, temporal 
aliasing transpires as a reversal of the perceived direction. This wagon wheel 
illusion is typically observed in movies due to the discrete sampling of video 
cameras. The continuous version of this wagon wheel illusion (c-WWI) differs 
in that it occurs when directly observing the moving pattern in continuous 
illumination; in this case, it has been proposed that reversed motion indicates 
a form of discrete sampling occurring in the visual system itself.
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ing in psychometric functions, based on model fitting (Dubois 
and VanRullen, 2009). (A write-up of this method and associated 
findings can be accessed at http://www.cerco.ups-tlse.fr/∼rufin/
assc09/). Results of a 2-AFC motion discrimination experiment 
were well explained by considering two motion sensing systems, 
one that functions continuously and one that takes periodic sam-
ples of position to infer motion. These two systems each give rise 
to predictable psychometric functions with few parameters, whose 
respective contributions to performance can be inferred by model 
fitting. Evidence for a significant contribution of a discrete process 
sampling at 13 Hz was found – thus confirming our previous con-
clusions from the c-WWI phenomenon. Furthermore, the discrete 
process contributed more strongly to the perceptual outcome when 
motion was presented inter-ocularly, than binocularly; this is com-
patible with our postulate that discrete sampling in the c-WWI is a 
high-level effect, since inter-ocular motion perception depends on 
higher-level motion perception systems (Lu and Sperling, 2001).
The second pitfall is that the temporal resolution for discrim-
inating the direction of the time-varying input under consid-
eration should be at least as good as the hypothesized sampling 
frequency. If the psychometric function is already at chance at the 
frequency where aliasing is expected to take place, this aliasing will 
simply not be observed – whether the perceptual process relies on 
periodic sampling or not. Our lab learned this the hard way: many 
of the features that we experimented with so far, besides lumi-
nance and contrast-defined motion, can only be discriminated 
at low-temporal frequencies – they belong to Holcombe’s “seeing 
slow” category (Holcombe, 2009). For example, we hypothesized 
that motion stimuli designed to be invisible to the first-order 
motion perception system, such as stereo-defined motion (Tseng 
et al., 2006), would yield maximal aliasing as there is no other 
motion perception system offering competing information. 
Unfortunately, these stimuli do not yield a clear percept at tempo-
ral frequencies beyond 3–4 Hz, meaning that any aliasing occur-
ring at higher frequencies would have escaped our notice. The 
“motion standstill” phenomenon reported by Lu and colleagues 
(Lu et al., 1999; Tseng et al. 2006) with similar stimuli at frequen-
cies around 5 Hz remains a potential manifestation of temporal 
aliasing, although we have not satisfactorily replicated it in our 
lab yet. We also hypothesized that binding of spatially distinct 
feature conjunctions, such as color and motion, could rely on 
sequential attentional sampling of the two features (Moutoussis 
and Zeki, 1997), and should thus be subject to aliasing. Again, 
we were disappointed to find that performance was at chance 
level at presentation rates higher than 3–4 Hz (Holcombe, 2009), 
precluding further analysis. We also attempted to adapt the wagon 
wheel phenomenon to the auditory modality. Here, perception 
of sound source motion (e.g., a sound rotating around the lis-
tener) also appeared limited to about 3 Hz (Feron et al., 2010). 
We then reasoned that frequency, rather than spatial position, was 
the primary feature for auditory perception, and designed peri-
odic stimuli that moved in particular directions in the frequency 
domain – so-called Shepard or Risset sequences (Shepard, 1964). 
Again, we found that the direction of these periodic frequency 
sweeps could not be identified when the temporal frequency of 
presentation was increased beyond 3–4 Hz.
Disentangling the neural mechanisms of the continuous wagon 
wheel illusion could be (and actually, is) the topic of an entirely 
separate review (VanRullen et al., 2010). To summarize, our current 
view is that the reversed motion signals most likely originate as a 
form of aliasing due to periodic temporal sampling by attention-
based motion perception systems, at a rate of ∼13 Hz; the bista-
bility of the illusion is due to the simultaneous encoding of the 
veridical motion direction by other (low-level, or “first-order”) 
motion perception systems. The debate, however, is as yet far from 
settled. At any rate, this phenomenon illustrates the potential value 
of temporal aliasing as a paradigm to probe the discrete nature of 
sensory perception.
other forms of temporal alIasIng
The sampling frequency evidenced with the c-WWI paradigm may 
be specific to attention-based motion perception mechanisms. It is 
only natural to try and extend the temporal aliasing methodology 
to perception of other types of motion, to perception of visual 
features other than motion or to perception in sensory modalities 
other than vision. If evidence for temporal aliasing could be found 
in these cases, the corresponding sampling frequencies may then be 
compared to one another and further inform our understanding of 
discrete perception. Is there a single rhythm, a central (attentional) 
clock that samples all sensory inputs? Or is information from any 
single channel of sensory information read out periodically at its 
own rate, independently from other channels? While the first prop-
osition reflects the understanding that most have of the theory of 
discrete perception (Kline and Eagleman, 2008), the latter may be 
a much more faithful description of reality; additionally, the sam-
pling rate for a given channel may vary depending on task demands 
and attentional state, further blurring intrinsic periodicities.
The simple generic paradigm which we advocate to probe the 
brain for temporal aliasing is as follows. Human observers are pre-
sented with a periodic time-varying input which physically evolves 
in an unambiguously defined direction; they are asked to make a 
two-alternative forced choice judgment on the direction of evo-
lution of this input, whose frequency is systematically varied by 
the experimenter across trials. A consistent report of the wrong 
direction at a given input frequency may be taken as a behavioral 
correlate of temporal aliasing, and the frequencies at which this 
occurs inform the experimenter about the underlying sampling 
frequency of the brain for this input.
Two main hurdles may be encountered in applying this para-
digm. The first one lies in what should be considered a “consistent” 
report of the wrong direction. Clearly, for an engineered sampling 
system, one can find input frequencies at which the system will 
always output the wrong direction. For a human observer, however, 
several factors could be expected to lower the tendency to report 
the wrong direction, even at frequencies that are subject to aliasing: 
measurement noise, the potential variability of the hypothetical 
sampling frequency over the duration of the experiment, and most 
importantly, the potential presence of alternate sources of informa-
tion (as in the c-WWI example, where competition occurs between 
low-level and attention-based motion systems). In the end, even if 
aliasing occurs, it may not manifest as a clear and reliable percept 
of the erroneous direction, but rather as a subtle increase of the 
probability of reporting the wrong direction at certain  frequencies. 
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1998; Eckstein, 1998; McElree and Carrasco, 1999; Eckstein et al., 
2000). Both models are still contemplated today – and indeed, they 
are extremely difficult to distinguish experimentally (Townsend, 
1990).
Multi-object tracking
The same difficulty also plagues paradigms other than visual 
search. Multi-object tracking, for instance, corresponds to a situ-
ation in which several target objects are constantly and randomly 
moving around the visual field, often embedded among similarly 
moving distractors (Pylyshyn and Storm, 1988). Sometimes, the 
objects are moving in feature space (i.e., changing their color 
or their orientation) rather than in physical space (Blaser et al., 
2000). The common finding that up to four – or sometimes more 
(Cavanagh and Alvarez, 2005) objects can be efficiently tracked at 
the same time has been taken as evidence that attention must be 
divided in parallel among the targets (Pylyshyn and Storm, 1988). 
However, in the limit where attention would be assumed to move 
at lightning speed, it is obvious that this simultaneous tracking 
capacity could be explained equally well by sequential shifts of 
a single attention spotlight, than by divided or parallel atten-
tion. Indeed, at least some of the existing data have been found 
compatible with a sequential process (Howard and Holcombe, 
2008; Oksama and Hyona, 2008). Since there is no general agree-
ment concerning the actual speed of attention (Duncan et al., 
1994; Moore et al., 1996; Hogendoorn et al., 2007), the question 
remains open.
Simultaneous/sequential paradigm
Other paradigms have been designed with the explicit aim of 
teasing apart the parallel and serial attention models. In the 
simultaneous/sequential paradigm, the capacity of attention to 
process multiple items simultaneously is assessed by presenting 
the relevant information for a limited time in each display cycle. 
In one condition (simultaneous) this information is delivered 
at once for all items; in the other condition (sequential) each 
item’s information is revealed independently, at different times. 
In both conditions the critical information is thus shown for 
the same total amount of time, such that a parallel model of 
attentional allocation would predict comparable performance; 
however, a serial attentional model would suffer more in the 
simultaneous condition, because attention would necessar-
ily miss the relevant information in one stimulus while it is 
sampling the other(s), and vice-versa (Eriksen and Spencer, 
1969; Shiffrin and Gardner, 1972). The paradigm was recently 
applied to the problem of multiple-object tracking (Howe et al., 
2010), and the data were deemed incompatible with serial atten-
tion sampling. A major source of confounds in this paradigm, 
however, is that, depending on stimulus arrangement param-
eters, certain factors (e.g., grouping, crowding) can improve 
or decrease performance in the simultaneous condition inde-
pendently of attention; similarly, other factors (e.g., apparent 
motion, masking) can improve or decrease performance in the 
sequential condition. It is unclear in the end how to tease apart 
the effects of attention from the potentially combined effects 
of all these extraneous factors.
In sum, although temporal aliasing is, in principle, a choice 
paradigm to probe the rhythms of perception, our attempts so 
far at applying this technique to other perceptual domains than 
motion (the c-WWI) have been foiled by the strict temporal limits 
of the corresponding sensory systems. What we can safely conclude 
is that, if discrete sampling exists in any of these other perceptual 
domains, it will be at a sampling rate above 3–4 Hz. We have not 
exhausted all possible stimuli and encourage others to conduct 
their own experiments. There are two faces to the challenge: finding 
stimuli that the brain “sees fast” enough, and using an appropri-
ate model to infer the contribution of periodic sampling to the 
psychometric performance (in case other sources of information 
and sizeable variability across trials should blur the influence of 
discrete processes).
rhythmIc samplIng of multIple stImulI: sequentIal 
vs. parallel attentIon
Let us return to our previous hypothetical situation. Now you 
have passed the traffic lights and driven home, and you turned on 
the TV to find out today’s lottery numbers. There are a handful 
of channels that can provide this information at this hour, so you 
go to “multi-channel” mode to monitor them simultaneously. 
The lottery results are not on, so you will wait until any channel 
shows them. How will you know which one? You try to process 
all channels at once, but their contents collide and confuse you. 
What if one of them shows the numbers but you notice it too 
late? By focusing on a single channel you would be sure not to 
miss the first numbers, but then what if you picked the wrong 
channel? In such a situation, it is likely that you will switch your 
attention rapidly between the different candidate channels until 
you see one that provides the required information. Your brain 
often faces the same problem when multiple objects are present 
in the visual field and their properties must be identified, moni-
tored or compared.
a long-standIng debate
Visual search
Whether your brain simultaneously and continuously shares its 
attentional resources (i.e., in “parallel”) between candidate tar-
get objects, or switches rapidly and sequentially between them, 
has been the subject of intense debate in the literature. We refer 
to this debate as “parallel vs. sequential attention.” Originally, 
attention was assumed to be a unitary, indivisible resource, and 
consequently the sequential model was favored, often implicitly 
(Eriksen and Spencer, 1969; Treisman, 1969; Kahneman, 1973). 
The first two decades of studies using the visual search paradigm 
were heavily biased toward this assumption (Treisman and Gelade, 
1980; Wolfe, 1998): when a target had to be identified among a 
varying number of distractors and the observer’s RT was found 
to increase steadily with the number of items, it was assumed 
that the additional time needed for each item reflected the dura-
tion of engaging, sampling and disengaging attention (hence 
the term “serial search slope”). It was only in the 1990s that this 
assumption was seriously challenged by proponents of an alter-
nate model, according to which attention is always distributed in 
parallel among items, and the increase in RT with increasing item 
number simply reflects the increasing task difficulty or decreasing 
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et al., under review). On each 40 s trial, we showed one, two, three 
or four wheels rotating in the same direction; the frequency of rota-
tion was varied between trials. From time to time, a subset of the 
wheels briefly reversed their direction, and the subjects’ task was to 
count and report how many of these reversal events had occurred 
in each trial. We reasoned that any aliasing would be manifested 
as an overestimation of the number of reversals. As expected from 
our experiments with the c-WWI, we found significant aliasing in 
a specific range of rotation frequencies. Most importantly, the fre-
quency of maximum aliasing significantly decreased as set size was 
increased, as predicted by the “sequential attention” idea. Although 
the magnitude of this decrease was lower than expected (the sam-
pling frequency was approximately divided by 2, from ∼13 Hz down 
to ∼7 Hz, while the set size was multiplied by 4), this finding poses 
a very serious challenge to the “parallel attention” theory.
the blInkIng spotlIght of attentIon
The crucial difficulty in distinguishing parallel and sequential 
accounts of attention is a theoretical one: any “set size effect” that 
can be explained by a division of attentional resources in time can, 
in principle, be explained equally well using a spatial division of the 
same resources (Townsend, 1990; Jans et al., 2010). There is a form 
of equivalence between the temporal and spatial domains, a sort 
of Heisenberg uncertainty principle, that precludes most attempts 
at jointly determining the spatial and temporal distributions of 
attention. In a recent experiment, however, we tried to break down 
this equivalence by measuring set size effects following a temporal 
manipulation of the stimuli – namely, after varying their effective 
duration on each trial (VanRullen et al., 2007). Thus we could tell, 
for example, how well three stimuli were processed when they were 
presented for 300 ms, and we could compare this to the perfor-
mance obtained for one stimulus presented 100, or 300 ms (or any 
other combination of set size and duration). The interest of this 
procedure was that different models of attentional division (e.g., 
sequential and parallel models) would make different predictions 
about how the psychometric function for processing one stimulus 
as a function of its duration should translate into corresponding 
psychometric functions for larger set sizes. To simplify, the space–
time equivalence was broken, because performance for sequentially 
sampling two (or three, or four) stimuli each for a fixed period 
could be predicted exactly, by knowing the corresponding perfor-
mance for a single stimulus that lasted for a duration equivalent to 
the sampling period; a simple parallel model, of course, could be 
designed to explain the change in performance from one to two (or 
three, or four) stimuli, but if the model was wrong it would then 
do a poor job at explaining performance obtained at other set sizes.
We compared three distinct models of attention allocation, each 
with a single free parameter. In the “parallel” model, all stimuli were 
processed simultaneously, and only the efficiency of this process-
ing varied as a function of attentional load (i.e., set size); the cost 
in efficiency was manipulated by the model’s free parameter. The 
second model, coined “sample-when-divided,” corresponded to the 
classic idea of a switching spotlight: when more than one stimu-
lus was present, the otherwise constant attentional resource was 
forced to sequentially sample the stimulus locations; the model’s 
free parameter was its sampling period, which affected its ability 
Split spotlight studies
To finish, there is yet another class of experiments that were intended 
to address a distinct albeit related question: when attention is divided 
among multiple objects, does the focus simply expand its size to 
include all of the targets, or does it split into several individual spot-
lights? To test this, these paradigms generally measure an improve-
ment of performance due to attention at two separate locations 
concurrently; the critical test is then whether a similar improvement 
can also be observed at an intervening spatial location: if yes, the 
spotlight may have been simply enlarged, if not it may have been 
broken down into independent spotlights. Psychophysical studies 
tend to support the multiple spotlights account (Bichot et al., 1999; 
Awh and Pashler, 2000). The same idea has also been applied to 
physiological measurements of the spotlight, demonstrating that 
EEG or fMRI brain activations can be enhanced by attention at 
two concurrent locations, without any enhancement at intervening 
locations (Muller et al., 2003; McMains and Somers, 2004). Now, 
how do these results on the spatial deployment of attention pertain 
to our original question about the temporal dynamics of attention? 
Inherent in the logic of this paradigm is the assumption that atten-
tional resources are divided constantly over time; multiple spotlights 
are implicitly assumed to operate simultaneously, rather than as a 
single, rapidly shifting focus. To support this assumption, authors 
often use limited presentation times (so attention does not have time 
to shift between targets), and speculate on the speed of attention. 
As mentioned before, since this speed is largely unknown, a lot of 
the data remain open to interpretation. In fact, our recent results 
in a very similar paradigm (in which we varied the delay between 
stimulus onset and the subsequent measurement of attentional 
deployment) showed that multiple simultaneous spotlights can in 
fact be observed, but are short-lived; when several target locations 
need to be monitored for extended periods of time, the attentional 
system quickly settles into a single-spotlight mode (Dubois et al., 
2009). In another related study we found that attention could not 
simultaneously access information from two locations, but instead 
relied on rapid sequential allocation (Hogendoorn et al., 2010).
The conclusion from studies that have used this kind of para-
digm is also fairly representative of the current status of the entire 
“sequential vs. parallel attention” debate, which we have briefly 
reviewed here. As summarized in a recent (and more thorough) 
review by Jans et al. (2010), most of the so-called demonstrations 
of multiple parallel attention spotlights rely on strong – and often 
unsubstantiated – assumptions about the temporal dynamics of 
attention. In sum, parallel attention has by no means won the prize.
temporal alIasIng returns
Could aliasing (see Temporal Aliasing: the Wagon Wheel Illusion 
and Other Forms of Temporal Aliasing) provide a way of resolving 
the “sequential vs. parallel attention” debate? If attention focuses on 
each target sequentially rather than continuously, the target infor-
mation will be sampled more or less periodically, and should thus 
be subject to aliasing artifacts; furthermore, the rate of sampling 
for each target should be inversely related to the number of targets 
to sample (i.e., the “set size”). On the other hand, parallel attention 
models have no reason to predict aliasing; and, even if aliasing were 
to occur, no reason to predict a change of aliasing frequency as a 
function of set size. We recently tested this idea using a variant of 
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conclusIon
The notion of a blinking spotlight illustrates a fundamental point: 
that discrete sampling and sequential attention could be two facets 
of a single process (Figure 3). Proponents of the discrete sampling 
theory should ask themselves: what happens when there are more 
than one relevant stimuli in the visual field? Can they all be pro-
cessed in a single “snapshot”? Advocates of sequential attention 
should ponder about the behavior of attention when it has only 
one target to monitor: is it useful – or even possible – for attention 
to pause its exploratory dynamics?
The simple theory that we propose is that periodic “covert” 
attentional sampling may have evolved from “overt” exploratory 
behavior (i.e., eye movements), as a means to quickly and effort-
lessly scan internal representations of the environment (VanRullen 
et al., 2005a; Uchida et al., 2006). Just as eye movements continue 
to occur even when there is only one object in the scene – lest the 
object quickly fade from awareness (Ditchburn and Ginsborg, 1952; 
Coppola and Purves, 1996; Martinez-Conde et al., 2006) – it is 
sensible to posit that attentional sampling takes place regardless of 
the number of objects to sample. Perception can then be said to be 
“discrete” or “periodic,” insofar as a very significant portion of its 
inputs (those depending on attentional mechanisms) are delivered 
periodically. For example, the ∼13 Hz discrete sampling responsible 
for the continuous wagon wheel illusion was found to be driven 
by attention (VanRullen et al., 2005b; VanRullen, 2006; Macdonald 
et al., under review). The frequency of this sampling progressively 
decreased to ∼7 Hz when two, three, and finally four “wagon wheel” 
stimuli had to be simultaneously monitored (Macdonald et al., 
under review). Interestingly, this ∼7 Hz periodicity was also the 
one indicated by our model of the “blinking spotlight” of attention 
(VanRullen et al., 2007). Altogether, our data raise the intriguing 
suggestion that attention creates discrete samples of the visual world 
with a periodicity of approximately one tenth of a second.
To conclude, we argue that it is constructive to unite the two 
separate psychophysical debates about discrete vs. continuous per-
ception (see Rhythmic Sampling of a Single Stimulus: Discrete vs. 
Continuous Perception) and sequential vs. parallel attention (see 
Rhythmic Sampling of Multiple Stimuli: Sequential vs. Parallel 
Attention). Discrete perception and sequential attention may 
represent perceptual and psychological manifestations of a single 
class of periodic neuronal mechanisms. Therefore, psychophysical 
progress in solving those debates could, ultimately, contribute to 
uncovering the role of low-frequency brain rhythms in perception 
and attention.
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to process multiple stimuli. Finally, we decided to consider a third 
model, termed “sample-always,” similar to the previous one except 
for the fact that it still collected and integrated successive attentional 
samples even when a single stimulus was present (see Figure 3 for an 
illustration); this model’s behavior was also governed by its sampling 
period. Our strategy was, then, to compare the three models’ ability 
to emulate the actual psychometric functions of human observers.
Compatible with existing findings (Palmer, 1995), we revealed 
that the parallel model could outperform the classic version of 
the sequential model – the “sample-when-divided” one, which 
considers that the attentional spotlight shifts around sequentially, 
but only when attention must be divided. However, the truly 
optimal model to explain human psychometric functions was 
the other variant of the sequential idea, a model in which atten-
tion always samples information periodically, regardless of set 
size. The rate of sampling was found to be ∼7 Hz. When atten-
tion is divided, successive samples naturally focus on different 
stimuli, but when it is concentrated on a single target, the samples 
continue to occur repeatedly every ∼150 ms, simply accumulat-
ing evidence for this one stimulus. In other words, our findings 
  supported a “blinking spotlight” of attention (VanRullen et al., 
2007) over the sequentially “switching spotlight” (and over the 
multiple “parallel spotlights”).
Figure 3 | relating discrete perception with sequential attention. (A) A 
sensory process that samples a single visual input periodically illustrates the 
concept of discrete perception. (B) A sensory process that serially samples 
three simultaneously presented visual stimuli demonstrates the notion of a 
sequential attention spotlight. Since many of our findings implicate attention in 
the periodic sampling processes displayed in (A), we propose that both types 
of periodic psychological operations (A,B) actually reflect a common 
oscillatory neuronal process. According to this view, the spotlight of attention 
is intrinsically rhythmic, which gives it both the ability to rapidly scan multiple 
objects, and to discretely sample a single source. (The yellow balls linked by 
red lines illustrate successive attentional samples.)
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